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Sound the Trumpets! Quebec is
Shouting, "Victory!" Despite the
Canadian Supreme Court's Denial of
Unilateral Secession
I. Introduction
What was it that tugged tourists away from their adventures
and to the steps of the High Court of Canada?1 It was a recent
Canadian Supreme Court decision. As the Peace Tower chimed
"0 Canada," the Court released its opinion holding that Quebec
cannot secede unilaterally from Canada.2  After decades of
attempted secession, Quebec presented it to the Supreme Court.
One might expect that the Quebecois3 would be hanging their
heads after being denied again. This time, Quebec's hunt for
independence was rejected by the Supreme Court. Surprisingly,
however, the citizens of Quebec claimed victory.4 The unfavorable
decision only fueled the fire for independence.
Quebec's excitement relies on a portion of the Court's
decision, which held that Quebec cannot secede unilaterally, or
without the rest of Canada's consent, but it may do so if it fulfills
two requirements. Quebec must first obtain a clear majority vote
from its citizens demanding secession. Second, it must participate
in a detailed negotiation process with Canada.5 The jubilation
shared by Quebecois regarding this decision, however, has left
many of the majority English-speaking Canadians puzzled and even
angry.6
1. Allan Thompson, High Court Latest Tourist Attraction, TORONTO STAR,
Aug. 21, 1998.
2. Id. at 1.
3. The natives of Quebec are known as the "Quebecois."
4. Rick Gibbons, Seizing Victory from the Jaws of Defeat, OTTAWA SUN,
Aug. 25, 1998, at 13.
5. Reference re Secession of Quebec, No. 25506, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 1.
The Supreme Court of Canada numbered the paragraphs. Thus, the page numbers
in this article refer to paragraphs.
6. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 13.
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After years of fighting for independence, Quebecois and non-
Quebecois are frustrated and tired.7  Nevertheless, despite
numerous rejections it appears the Quebecois will continue to
fight.8 The first part of this comment examines Quebec's prior
attempts to maintain its identity, beginning as early as 1867. The
second part studies the reasoning behind the recent Canadian
Supreme Court's rejection of Quebec's unilateral session. The third
part discusses Canada's reaction to this decision and whether
Quebec will persevere. Finally, the fourth part will analyze
whether Quebec should pursue secession or merely maintain the
threat.
II. Evolution of Quebec's Fight to Secede
A. Early History of Canada and the Constitutional Fight
1. The Constitutional Act of 1867. -Quebec's concern for its
distinct culture and independence began with the creation of the
Constitutional Act of 1867 ("the Act").9 The Constitutional Act
of 1867 developed the first quasi-independent dominion within the
British Empire." The Act divided powers between the central
government and various provinces, including Quebec." Despite
the Act's guarantees to help preserve Quebec's language, religion,
and culture, the French-speaking Quebecois were troubled. 2
The year 1960 brought changes. 3 Quebec became restless after
the Quebec Liberal Party gained power demanding changes in
favor of their independence."4 The desire for special status
separating Quebec from other provinces and creating a dual nation
became apparent in the early days of the Liberal Party.'5 Their
first victory came in 1969 when Canada officially became bilingual
with the Official Languages Act. 16 Their next achievement did
not arrive for more than a decade.
7. Opinions from Across Canada, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1998.
8. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 13.
9. Susan Lavergne, The Future of Canadian Federalism, 23 GA. J. INT'L &





14. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 69.
15. Id.
16. Id.
QUEBEC IS SHOUTING, "VICTORY"!
2. The Constitutional Act of 1982.-In the 1960s and 1970s,
constitutional negotiations occasionally took place, but ultimately
died because of the parties' "conflicting interests and agendas.' 17
A change took place in the early 1980s when newly elected Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau made constitutional concerns number one
on his list of concerns. 18 Trudeau's desire to reform the Constitu-
tion was so resolute that he was willing to proceed without
provincial consensus.19
With Ottawa's support, Trudeau made adoption of a reformed
Constitution and a Charter of Rights the centerpieces of his
proposal. °  Although this appeared to have broad popular
support, Quebec was outraged.2' Quebec began the fight against
what it believed to be a unilateral reform, even though Trudeau's
actions were constitutional.22 In response to its concerns, Quebec
developed alternative proposals.23
Trudeau did not pay attention to these proposals and set off
with his package to London.24 Backed by the fury and desire for
independence, Quebec released one of its proposals, and along with
several other provinces sought the Supreme Court's opinion.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that "substantial" provincial
consent was required to make constitutional amendments, which
Trudeau lacked.
Finally, on the night of November 24, 1981, the federal
government and nine predominantly English-speaking provinces
agreed on the Constitutional Act of 1982.26 The act strengthened
individual and minority rights and federal courts, and added
amending formulas that would appeal to all Canadians. 27
17. R. KENT WEAVER, THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA 57 (1982).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 58. The proposal also eliminated the British Parliament's role in the
amendment process. Id.
21. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 58.
22. Id. at 59. Quebec considered the constitutionality of unilateral actions as
early as the 1980s.
23. Id.
24. Id. Trudeau was missing the agreement of eight provinces when he went
to London. Id.
25. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 58. The Court noted that conventionally
speaking its decision was not legally binding. Id. at 59. The Supreme Court later
required a substantial consensus for unilateral secession.
26. Id.
27. Id. The "provincial qualities" were set forth in order to gain substantial
provincial assent. Id.
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Although the Constitutional Act of 1982 emphasized individual
rights, Quebec was displeased that it had not been given any special
rights. 28 Hence, Quebec challenged the constitutionality of the act
but lost.29 Hope arose, however, in 1985 when a new government
came into power and promised to address Quebec's aspirations. 30
B. Quebec'sModern Attempts at Secession
1. The Meech Lake Accord. -Quebec's desires were
addressed at the Meech Lake Accord ("the Accord") in April,
1987. 31 The Meech Lake Accord mandated that Canada recognize
five Quebecian claims of right.32 The first was "a constitutional
recognition of Quebec's status as a 'distinct society'. ',33  The
second was "the constitutionalism of Quebec's preeminence in
controlling immigration to the province., 34 The third addressed
"restrictions on federal spending in areas of provincial jurisdic-
tion., 35 The fourth mandated was "a Quebec veto over constitu-
tional amendments involving changes to federal institutions, and an
extension of Quebec's right to opt out with compensation from
amendments transferring jurisdiction from the provinces to
Ottawa."36 The final claim sought "participation in naming some
Supreme Court of Canada judges., 37 English-speaking Canada
hoped that this accord would squelch Quebec's desire to secede.38
The measures set forth in the Meech Lake Accord also responded
to the grievances of other provinces. 39 Thus, Quebec's "province-
specific demands" were generalized to all provinces.40
28. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 59. Quebec did not receive its desired veto
over most constitutional amendments. Id.
29. Id. at 60. Quebec argued that its approval was required on the basis of its
status as the principal home of one of Canada's two linguistic groups. Id.
30. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 72.
31. Id. at 63.




36. Id. at 61.
37. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 61.
38. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 65.
39. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 61. For example, the provision giving other
provinces the authority to nominate people to try new Senate vacancies until
comprehensive Senate reform could be initiated. Id.
40. Id.
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The Accord had two notable features.4' First, it used many
methods to guarantee freedoms, contrary to the single overall
theme used in the 1982 Constitutional Act.42 Second, it utilized
the new ratification method of the 1982 Constitutional Act, whereas
the negotiation system remained the same.43 This was the first
test of the new ratification formula." It required provincial
unanimity in some areas, approval by provincial legislatures as well
as premiers in other areas, and a three-year time limit for ratifica-
tion.45
Most Quebecers were confident that the Accord would be
ratified.' The Prime Minister, all provincial premiers, and the
leaders of the federal opposition parties approved it.47 But
criticism sprung from Pierre Trudeau, who believed that the Accord
would lead to Canada's loss of control over the provinces and was
a repeat of "preferential treatment" for Quebec.48  English-
speaking Canadians, as well as some aboriginal leaders, joined
Trudeau in expressing their fear that their language rights would
face further erosion.49
As the three-year ratification period continued, opposition to
the Meech Lake Accord grew steadily.5" In the end, the provinces
of Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland had deep
reservations about the Accord.5 1 Consequently, as the spring 1990
deadline approached, things looked dismal for Quebec and the
Accord.52 Finally, after a final full week of negotiations in early
June, the Meech Lake Accord expired.53 Quebec felt that the
entire country was attacking it. Therefore, Quebec's demands




42. Id. A variety of mechanisms were used here. Additional power was
delegated to provinces in controlling immigration and limited-government
guarantees were strengthened by increasing hurdles to constitutional amendments
and use of federal spending powers. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 61.
43. Id. at 62. It was to be ratified using executive federalism. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 62.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 63.
50. Id.
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2. The Charlottetown Accord of 1992. -For many English-
speaking Canadians, the secessionist nightmare was over. Never-
theless, in 1992 Quebec managed to push its way into another
accord, this time at Charlottetown.55 Quebec not only wanted
special recognition from the other provinces, but it also wanted to
promote its own social and cultural development.56 In July of
1992, a revised "distinct society" provision was set forth and
negotiations began shortly thereafter.57
Negotiations produced the Charlottetown Accord. It recog-
nized Quebec as a society with its own distinct French character,
gave Quebec more provincial membership in the Senate than other
provinces, and recognized Quebec's right to self-government.58
This was only the third time since the formation of Canada in 1867
that a national referendum had been held, and it marked the first
time that support for Canada as a whole was submitted to a
nationwide electoral test.59 On October 26, 1992, Canadian
citizens made their way to the polls to determine Canada's future,
as Quebecers stood by in anticipation. 6
Many Canadians were relieved when the answer came; it was
a resounding "No., 61 Six provinces, including Quebec, rejected
the Accord.6 2 Quebec rejected the reforms by a margin of 55%
to 42% .63 English-speaking Canadians believed that too much was
being surrendered to Quebec, while a large minority of Quebecers
believed that they were not being given enough.' After two years
of debate, the Quebec separatists were back to the drawing
board.65
55. Id. at 64.
56. WEAVER, supra note 17, at 64.
57. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 64.
58. Id. at 65.
59. Canadian Voters Reject Reforms; Constitutional Plan's Fall a Blow to
Efforts to Preserve Unity, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al.
60. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 65.
61. Id.
62. Martin W.G. King, Canada's Prime Minister Faces Crisis after Referendum,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at A29.
63. Canadian Voters Reject Reforms, supra note 59, at Al.
64. Lavergne, supra note 9, at 65.
65. Canadian Voters Reject Reforms, supra note 59, at Al.
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III. Reference re Secession of Quebec: The Supreme Court
Says No
Since Quebec did not receive the Canadian government's
support for secession, it sought the Supreme Court's permission to
secede unilaterally. 66  This effort, however, proved futile. On
August 21, 1998, the Supreme Court denied Quebec's right to
secede both domestically and internationally.67  The holding set
forth several reasons for denial and it provided a guideline to
follow for future secessionist efforts.
68
A. Issue 1 Before the Supreme Court: Can Quebec Secede
Unilaterally from Canada?
The Canadian Supreme Court was presented with several
questions concerning Quebec's secession. 69  The first issue was
whether Quebec's government could effect secession from Canada
unilaterally.7" The Court held that Quebec needed a clear
majority vote for secession within its boundaries and a negotiation
process between two legitimate majorities - Quebec and the citizens
of Canada.71
The Court defined "secession" as "the effort of a group or
section of a state to withdraw itself from the political and constitu-
tional authority of that state, with a view to achieving statehood for
a new territorial unit on the international plane."72 Although it
has proven to be difficult, the Court held that secession requires a
radical and extensive amendment to the Constitution.73 The
holding was based on the fact that the Canadian Constitution does
not expressly authorize or prohibit a province's secession from
66. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 29, at 2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. The Court adopted a domestic perspective to decide this issue. Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 81.
71. Id. at 91.
72. Id. at 81. The Court noted that secession is typically "a territorial unit
seeking to withdraw from the federation" in a federal state like Canada. Id.
73. Id. at 82. The Court was not persuaded by the argument that secession
required more than an amendment because it would have a significant impact on
Canada. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 82. Secession
would alter the governance of Canadian territory in a way that would be inconsis-
tent with Canada's current constitution. Id. Therefore, whether the changes
would be drastic was irrelevant. Id.
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Canada.74 The Court held that if the Constitution is the expres-
sion of the sovereignty of the people of Canada, then it is within
their power to change it.
75
The Court was asked only whether Quebec could secede
unilaterally.76 Therefore, the Court based its decision on the
legality of the final act of unilateral secession. 77 "Unilaterally"
was defined by the Court as "the right to effectuate secession
without prior negotiations with the other provinces and the federal
government. 7 1 Quebecers felt that presenting the issue of
unilateral secession to the Supreme Court was, perhaps, the only
option they had left.
1. First, A Referendum in Quebec Is Required. -The Supreme
Court rejected the notion of unilateral secession, but instructed
Quebec on other methods of secession.79 First, the Supreme
Court declared that Quebec needed a referendum, because a clear
expression of the people is needed on an issue of this magnitude.8"
A referendum provides a democratic method of obtaining the
voters' views on a political issue.8' Next, the Court stated that the
referendum must be free of ambiguity in the question presented
and the terms of its support." Then a clear majority must
approve the referendum.83 As defined by the Court, a "clear
majority" is "a qualitative evaluation."'8 According to the Court,
if Quebec could clearly repudiate the existing Constitution, then it
would confer legitimacy on its demands for secession.8 5 Further-
more, it would place an obligation on the other provinces and the
federal government to acknowledge and respect Quebec's decision. 6
74. Id.
75. Id. at 83. The Court could not adopt a political position and answer the
issue presented, but noted that the ultimate decision was that of the people.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 82.
76. Id at 84.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Court decided that "unilateral" did not mean "a constitutional
amendment initiated by a single actor" in the present case. Id. at 84.
79. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 2.
80. Id. at 85.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 85.
84. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 85.
85. Id. at 86.
86. Id. A clear expression that Quebec wants to pursue secession gives rise
to a reciprocal obligation on the rest of Canada to negotiate constitutional
changes. Id. at 86.
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2. Second, the Nation Must Negotiate. -Canada's new
obligation to acknowledge Quebec's desire to pursue secession
requires the entire country to sit at the negotiating table and create
some constitutional changes.87 According to the Court, Quebec
alone cannot invoke a right of self-determination and dictate the
terms of a proposed secession to the other parties."s Negotiation
is a necessity. If Quebec clearly expresses its desire to leave
Canada, then the rest of Canada cannot ignore it.89 The Court
held that the other provinces in Canada cannot exercise their rights
in such a way as to deny absolutely Quebec's rights, as long as
Quebec exercises its rights while respecting them.90 Only then
may Quebec propose secession. 91
Once the proposition is made, negotiations must begin.92 The
Court warned the negotiators to keep an eye on the country's
constitutional principles and to keep its citizens informed of all the
actions taking place. 93 It added that negotiations may not lead to
an agreement among the parties.94 Based on past referendums,
the Court noted that negotiations will be difficult.95
Who is finally going to decide if Quebec will secede? Quebec
was hoping that the Supreme Court would, but the Court disap-
pointed Quebec. The Court declined to assume any role other than
to simply identify the relevant aspects of the Constitution in the
broadest sense possible.96 They left the rest up to the politi-
cians.97 Only they have access to all of the relevant information
87. Id. at 89. A constitutional amendment is initiated by elected represen-
tatives of Canada. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 86.
The corollary to this is the obligation to negotiate. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 90.
90. Id. at 91. The Court told the parties that if Quebec can secede, then so
can the other provinces. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39,
at 91.
91. Id. at 91.
92. Id. at 92.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 94.
95. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 95. The Court
noted that a referendum inevitably would address a wide range of issues, including
the question of the economic, political, and social integration across Canada. Id.
at 94.
96. Id. at 98. The problems presented by a referendum would be resolved
within the rule of law. Id.
97. Id. at 99. The Court maintained its constitutional obligation to restrain
from a political position. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39,
at 96.
1999]
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needed for the citizens to make the final decision.9" The Court
only required a negotiation.99
The Court gave the Canadian government a little incentive to
continuing seeking independence. It held that if the government
fails to undertake negotiations and pursue them according to
constitutional principles, the government's legitimacy may be
undermined."0 Canada's legitimacy is, after all, a precondition
for acceptance in the international community.' °1
In sum, Quebec cannot secede from Canada unilaterally. It
could only secede after obtaining a clear majority vote in Quebec
and after participating in a negotiation process with the hostile
provinces in Canada. °2 Thus, the fight is not over. In fact, it
may only be getting underway. If Quebec follows the constitutional
guidelines given by the Canadian Supreme Court, Quebec's chances
of being recognized by the international community are greater.
B. Second Issue Before the Supreme Court: Will International
Law Give Quebec the Right to Secede?
In the event that the first question was denied, Quebec posed
a second question to the Canadian Supreme Court.0 3 The next
issue was whether international law would give a right to self-
determination that would give Quebec the right to secede. 1"
Again, the Court's answer was no.1" 5 It may be presumptuous for
Quebec to believe that the international community would accept
it after the secession effort has been denied by Canada, which has
long been its global friend.
98. Id. at 96.
99. Id. at 95.
100. Id. at 101.
101. Id. If Quebec follows constitutional principles while seceding, then it is
more likely to be recognized by the international community. Reference re
Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 101.
102. Id.
103. Id. A third question was also posed to the Court as to whether domestic
or international law would prevail in the event of a conflict. Id. The Court did
not believe it necessary to answer this question because, based on its answers to
the first two issues, it saw no conflict. Id. at 101.
104. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 2. The Court
adopted international law as the relevant standard to decide the second issue. Id.
at 81.
105. Id. The Court's denial of the right to secede under international law
applies to all provinces in Canada. Id. at 107.
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The Court held that international law does grant self-determi-
nation to "peoples," or a group seeking self-determination. 6 In
1995, the UN General Assembly declared that people would be
given the right to self-determination and secession if they meet one
of three conditions.1 7 First, a colonial empire must govern
them.108 Second, the people must have been subjected to alien
subjugation, domination, or exploitation.10 9 Third, they will be
given the right to secede only if they have been denied in any
meaningful exercise of the right to self-determination."0
The Court was quick to hold that the first condition was
irrelevant."' Quebec was not governed by a colonial empire." 2
The second was equally inapplicable because Quebecers have not
been the victims of attacks on Quebec's physical presence or its
integrity, or subjected to alien domination.1 3 In fact, for the last
fifty years, the Canadian Prime Minister has come from Que-
bec.'14 In addition, Quebecers have had the opportunity to hold
all the most important positions in the federal Cabinet, and from
1988 until 1996 the Prime Minister and Leader of the Official
Opposition in the House of Commons were both from Quebec. 5
At the present time, the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right
Honorable Chief Justice and two other members of the Court, and
the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN are natives of Que-
106. Id. at 120. The right of self-determination takes into account the particular
situation of the people seeking recognition. Reference re Secession of Quebec,
1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 120. The right does not encourage any action that would
dismember a government that represents the whole people belonging to it. Id. at
120.
107. Id. The UN General Assembly adopted this rule regarding the right of
self-determination in its Declaration on the Occasion of the Fifteenth Anniversary
of the United Nations, GA Res. 50/6, 9 November 1995. Id. at 117. The Court
described two types of self-determination, recognized by the international
community. Id. The first was internal self-determination, "a people's pursuit of
its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of
an existing state." Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 117.
The second type was external self-determination, "the establishment of a sovereign
and independent state, the free association or integration with an independent
state or emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people."
Id. Only when the former is denied, will the latter be accepted. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, 117.
111. Id. at 124.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 132.
114. Id.
115. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 132.
1999]
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bec. 116 These lofty achievements of Quebecers prove that they
have been successful in gaining control throughout Canada.117
Furthermore, according to the UN's Final Act of the Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe, a state may maintain
its territorial power if that state represents its entire people equally,
and respects the principles of self-determination. 8 Thus, Quebec
did not meet the second condition for international community
recognition.
Similarly, the Supreme Court easily dispatched the third
condition. The citizens of Quebec can freely make political choices
and pursue their own self-development within the borders of
Quebec, Canada, and the rest of the world." 9 Thus, Quebec
could not receive the right to self-determination and secession
because it could not meet any of the three conditions.12 ° Accord-
ing to the Court, the foregoing demonstrates that Quebec does not
have an international right to secede.121
In conclusion, the Canadian Supreme Court held that Canadi-
an law does not permit Quebec's unilateral secession. And
international law does not give Quebec the right to self-determina-
tion, which would give it the right to secede.122 The question that
remains, however, is whether or not Quebec will continue to pursue
secession. While some English-Canadians would like to waive
good-bye to Quebec, others may not be so willing.
IV. Quebec's Reaction Following the Supreme Court Decision
A. Quebec's Victory Cry
One headline read, "The Supreme Court Decision Seemed
Simple Enough: Quebec Does Not Have the Right to Declare
Unilateral Independence.', 23 Some said that it was the Supreme
Court's toughest test ever because politicians asked it to rule on the
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 118.
119. Id. at 133.
120. Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 Can. LEXIS 39, at 120.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 152.
123. Quebec Can't Go It Alone... But on a Clear Referendum Question, With
a Clear "Yes" Majority, the Rest of Canada Must Negotiate Terms of a Split, THE
OTTAWA SUN, Aug. 21, 1998.
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future of Canada.'24 One author believed the Court passed with
flying colors. 2 ' The majority of the country, however, is not as
certain. After studying the reactions of Canadian citizens, the
Supreme Court's decision does not seem to be clear in its rejection
of Quebec's secession.
The decision could have been a humbling, perhaps even
irreversible, setback for Quebecois separatists. 126  The result,
however, was quite to the contrary. Quebec Premier Lucien
Bouchard quickly spun it into a triumph for Quebec, asserting that
Canada is now obligated to negotiate Quebec's secession in good
faith.127
One journalist believed that those in support of Quebec's
separation from Canada did a brilliant job with the Supreme
Court's decision.12 Perhaps this was made easier by the court's
rambling on about what constitutes a majority and its description
of Canada's obligation to negotiate if a "Yes vote" occurs. 129 The
Court may have done nothing more than ensure more litiga-
tion.130
The separatists claim that the Canadian government shot itself
in the foot by going to the Supreme Court with the question of
secession."' Some refer to it as "'arroseur arrose," referring to
someone who uses a hose to try to spray water on someone else
but ends of spraying it on himself.3 2 The separatists' excitement
arises out of the notion that one of the biggest obstacles in
persuading hesitant nationalists to follow them has been re-
moved. 3'
Some Quebecers, however, harbored certain fears concerning
sovereignty.3 They thought that the rest of Canada would not
negotiate with them.'35 Now that Canada cannot attempt to scare
124. Ray Martin, Supreme Wisdom in Decision, EDMONTON SUN, Aug. 26,
1998, at 11.
125. Id.
126. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 13.
127. Id.
128. Rafe Mair, PQ and BQ Turn Attention to the Entrails, Not the Chicken:
Chretien and Dion Rise to the Bait, FIN. POST, Sept. 4, 1998, at 13.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Robert McKenzie, PQ Leaders Cheer Death of Federal Hard Line,
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Quebecers by saying that they will refuse to deal with them, what
will these apprehensive Quebecers do? Will they join the fight for
independence or will they remain hidden behind their fears?
Some Canadians believe that Quebecers may now feel safer to
vote because a "Yes" vote could result in a better deal for them
and not necessarily independence. 13 6 Is that what Quebec really
wants? Do they simply want a better deal or are they looking for
more? Even Prime Minister Jean Chretien acknowledged that
Canada will not hold Quebec against its clearly expressed will. 137
The Court has told them that if the country breaks up, it must be
handled democratically and peacefully.'38
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer expressed his frustration upon
hearing Quebec's reaction to the opinion.'39 He feels that his
words have been misinterpreted, but he questions whether he
should correct the country's interpretation of his opinion."n The
justices of the Canadian Supreme Court have traditionally refused
to comment on their decisions, but there have been times when
they wanted to correct the country's interpretation of them.14'
He kept his comments general when he explained, "Quebec cannot
legally secede without some sort of consent from the rest of the
country."'42  Conversely, the people adverse to Quebec's seces-
sion have adopted an interpretation of the Court's opinion similar
to that of Chief Justice Lamer's.
Prime Minister Chretien urged Bouchard to read the whole
opinion and not just the parts he likes.'43 Immediately following
the decision, Justice Minister Ann McLellan and Stephane Dion
were dispatched to the media where they asked Bouchard to
promise never to attempt a unilateral secession."' Perhaps
Chretien's actions were a bit harsh, but they expressed the general
consensus of secessionist critics.
It appears that the majority of Canada was aghast at Quebec's
jubilation over the Court's opinion. And many Canadians have
136. Rosemary Speirs, Plan B Backfires and Moves Talks about the Constitution
Off Chretien's Back Burner, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1998, at Bi.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Edison Stewart, Judge Wonders How to Right Twisted Rulings. Should He





143. Speirs, supra note 136, at B1.
144. Id.
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attacked Bouchard and his ideas. Specifically, one journalist
criticized Bouchard for not distinguishing between a simple
majority and the "clear majority," which the Supreme Court set as
a minimum benchmark.145 The same journalist accused Bouchard
of believing that any majority is a clear majority." The message
is clear. The Supreme Court has muddied the waters just enough
for Bouchard to establish his own interpretation.'47
Several opinions from across Canada demonstrate Canadians'
contrasting views on the decision.148 On one hand, the Halifax
Chronicle-Herald stated that neither side can claim a victory
because the decision merely provided the nation with guidance.149
On the other hand, the Calgary Herald believed said that the Court
treated the sincere political convictions of Quebec separatists with
respect, without compromising the equally legitimate stance of the
federal government in any way.5'
Other Canadians, however, are angry over Quebec's desire to
secede. The Moncton Times and Transcript said that, "Quebec
can't just walk away from the rest of us," at least not without a
series of intense, far-ranging negotiations.51  They recognized
that Canada can still say "No" to secession, but it must negotiate
first.152
Aside from those Canadians who believe that the Court's
decision was unclear, others think that it provided useful guide-
lines.153 The Windsor Star noted that the judgment gave Ottawa
a blueprint to begin preparing for the next referendum.154 One
citizen claimed that the Supreme Court wrote Bouchard's "clear
question" for him: "Do you give the government a mandate to
negotiate Quebec sovereignty?"'55 Perhaps this will be the next
referendum question.
The Vancouver Sun made a surprising interpretation of the
Court's opinion.'56 The Sun believed that the decision provided
clarity by applying common sense and lessons of Canadian history
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to the questions.15 7 It took comfort in the degree of difficulty laid
out by the court in determining the steps for secession.1 58
The Nanaimo Daily News recognized that there remains
nothing the rest of Canada could do to keep Quebec in the
Confederation. 159 The Nanaimo Daily News is not ready to back
down yet. "To keep Canada together from sea to sea, we are going
to need real legal, economic, political, and military clout."'60 Will
English-speaking Canada, indeed, resort to violence resulting in a
Canadian civil war? It will be interesting to see what happens as
Quebec tries yet again for independence. What will Canada do in
the meantime?
Some fear that Quebec will continue to determine the content
of the next referendum and the result will be disastrous.
161
Therefore, some anti-secessionist Liberals feel they must take
action. First, Quebec must gain two-thirds of Quebecers' support
to offer the question of secession to the rest of Canada. 62 Sec-
ond, the secession question must make it clear that Quebecers have
to chose between Canada and an independent Quebec, in order to
have a fair referendum question.'63 Finally, it must be made
evident that the federalists will not recognize the results of, or
participate in, any referendum that fails to meet these terms.1
64
If these conditions are not met, uproar could occur throughout
Canada.165 Canada will not give up without a fight.
166
In November, 1997, a poll was taken concerning whether
Quebec would attempt secession after the results of the Supreme
Court were published. 167  More than two-thirds of Canadians
outside Quebec believed that the court case, and related hard-line
efforts, made it more likely that Canada would remain united. 6 8
The government was aiming for two things. 69  First, Prime
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constituted a mandate to leave the federation. 7 ° Second, Chret-
ien wanted to show that Canadian and international laws applied
to secession, in order to let those Quebecers wary of secession
know that separation would not be painless. 7'
As a result of the recent Supreme Court decision, the country
has been left more confused as to whether Quebec may secede
from Canada. The unconstitutionality of unilateral secession is the
only certainty now."' And this has not quelled Quebec's seces-
sionist desires. Now Quebec believes that it has the Court's
permission to secede by simply negotiating.'73 The negotiations,
however, may prove to far from.
Chretien noted that any negotiations would be complex for a
number of reasons.174  First, the personal rights of minorities,
aboriginals, and Canadians outside Quebec must be taken into
account.1 75  Second, the issue of whether Quebec's existing
boundaries would remain intact exists.176 One thing for Quebec
to keep in mind throughout the negotiation process is that "Canada
is not just ten provinces, it's one country. ' 177
As one author inquired, "Will [Quebec] draw back from the
dangers in [its] strategy of clarifying the rules of breakup now that
the Supreme Court's ruling turned out to be a double-edged
sword?" 17
8
As one Canadian said, "It's sad that it had to go to court, that
we're even discussing the fact that [Quebec] want[s] to leave our
country." '179 Although other Canadians may share his sentiment,
Quebec can continue to fight. Bouchard is calling the decision a
"tremendous boost to separation because Quebecers know that if
they vote 'Yes,' the rest of the country must negotiate.' ' 80 Now
that separatist Lucien Bouchard has been re-elected as Quebec's
leader, will Quebec pursue secession or simply threaten it?
170. Id.
171. Id.
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B. Quebec's Future in the Hands of Separatist Lucien Bouchard
On November 30, 1998, separatist Lucien Bouchard once again
won the seat as Quebec's premier. 8' Liberal leader Charest and
Canadian Prime Minister Chretien both thought that their best
chance of stopping Bouchard and avoiding the creation of a third
referendum was a Liberal victory in Quebec's provincial elec-
tion."' Not only did they lose the election, but they also may be
forced to wait in anticipation of another referendum.
Prior to the election, in the hope of stopping Bouchard,
Charest and Chretien adopted a plan of silence. 83 Everyone was
trying to keep silent about the Supreme Court ruling with the
approaching election, with the expectation that Bouchard would
forget about it.1"4 However, that approach did not work. Less
than one month before the election, Bouchard reminded Canada
that independence would be the best solution for Quebec. 185
The rest of Canada, which is commonly referred to as Ottawa,
also had plans to keep Quebec from leaving Canada.186 Ottawa
considered following up the Supreme Court ruling with a political
strategy that would define a fair referendum question and what
kind of a majority was needed to force negotiations.' 7 It aban-
doned this idea fearing that it would hurt Charest's chance to oust
Bouchard from office.1 88
Some Canadians feel that Ottawa may try to prevent Canada's
approval of secession by setting out some guidelines.'89 Those
guidelines could include the share of the national debt Quebec
would assume, the requirements for Canadian citizenship, and the
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rights of aboriginal people.' 9° Another possibility is a federal
referendum. 9'
If these plans fail to stop Bouchard from attempting secession,
then Canada needs to discuss its next plan of attack.' 92 The first
discussion needs to concern the form of a fair referendum question
for secession. 193 Then Canada must discuss the amount of post-
secession sharing of the same monetary unit and the same citizen-
ship or joint-citizenship. 9 n Quebec's land mass and the cost of
resettling the rest of Canada must also be discussed.' 95 Now that
Bouchard has won Quebec's election, these issues may become very
important. Prior to the election, Canadians were unsure how
Bouchard would proceed.
One pre-election bet was that if Bouchard was re-elected by
forty-eight percent or higher, it was likely that a referendum on
secession would be held within eighteen months and Chretien
would be pressured to step aside as Prime Minister. 96 Another
bet made by the federal government's unity minister was that a
referendum would come within months of the election. 97 Only
Bouchard knows when the next referendum will come because he
has the authority to hold a referendum at any time.198
Bouchard has said, however, that he will wait for a "winning
condition" before calling for another referendum.1 9  Although
Bouchard never exactly defined a winning condition, he did say
that if Quebec's economy were stronger, Quebec would have more
confidence to become a sovereign country.2' ° A stronger econo-
my would include a continued drop in unemployment, more young
people finding work, and the demolition of Quebec's spending
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deficit by spring.2 1  Bouchard believes that when this occurs,
Quebec will have the confidence to secede.2 2
Some predicted that the day after the election a debate would
begin over what exactly constitutes a clear question, a clear
majority, and Quebec's borders. 23 Bouchard claims that his sole
interest is to fight for the rights of Quebec, whether it takes
secession or not.2' But he has not chosen to discuss the particu-
lars of secession since the election.2 5 Perhaps it is because
Bouchard only carried forty-three percent of the seats in Que-
bec.21 Or maybe Bouchard has not begun creating a referendum
because a poll taken at the election showed that seventy-five
percent of Quebecers did not want another referendum.2 7
Others believe that the threat of a Quebecois separation has ended
for the foreseeable future.20 8
Some Canadians believe that the threat of secession has finally
been revealed for what it truly is - "pure politics. ' 29  One
Canadian journalist stated that the threat was real in the early
1970s, but now it is simply a bargaining tool.210 In order for the
tool to be useful, however, the rest of Canada has to think that the
threat is real.211 But does the threat hold any legitimacy today?
Quebec would like to severely restrict the large province's
power to create a new health care system and establish other social
programs or change existing ones without Quebec's consent.212
Quebec also wants the right to withdraw from any new or modified
Canadian social programs. 213 And it wants to receive full federal
compensation in order to create its own program.214 Independent
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advisory panels to help settle disputes regarding social programs
are also an item on Quebec's wishlist.21
Despite the polls, Quebecers gave Bouchard a strong mandate
to separate by re-electing him.216  But they are gambling by
hoping that Bouchard will not take the secession route.217 More-
over, Quebec also gave Bouchard the authority to wield the threat
of secession whenever talks with the federal government get too
tough.2 ' By getting elected, he obtained the power to create the
winning conditions.
219
In further support of Bouchard's desire to use secession as a
threat, he said that Quebec would accept a constitutional amend-
ment giving provinces the right to opt out of social programs with
full compensation.22 ° If a referendum is held, Bouchard declared
that it would only be held on secession.221 It will not be on a
specific constitutional amendment.222 Bouchard is looking for
fifty-one percent to win the referendum, although he claimed that
he would like to have more.223
Although some English-speaking Quebecers cry out against
secession efforts, 224 Bouchard continues to fight for Quebec's
independence. English-speaking Quebecers have tried to dissuade
the rest of Quebec from pursuing secession with their ballots,
checkbooks, and voices, but they are losing steam.225 It appears
that they are giving up because they are being ignored by French-
speaking Quebecers and thrown out of Quebec's mainstream.226
Justice Minister Stephane Dion agrees with those English-
speaking Quebecers against secession.227 In a letter to Bouchard
dated April 9, 1999, Dion gave Bouchard two suggestions concern-
ing his secession efforts. 22 The first and preferred suggestion was
that Bouchard forget his plans for another referendum, which
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would divide and weaken Quebec. 229 Instead, Dion told Bou-
chard to focus on working together with the other provinces to
ensure prosperity and social progress for Canada.2 3 The second
suggestion was to respect the Supreme Court decision and its
requirements for clarity regarding a majority.231
Bouchard, however, has yet to waiver under the pressure to
abandon secession efforts. On June 7, 1999, Bouchard announced
his impatience to hold another referendum on Quebec sovereign-
ty.232 The launching pad for the referendum is set for May, 2000,
at the next full-scale Parti Quebecois convention.233 Bouchard
declared that the referendum is a question of identity.234 Quebec
began securing its own identity by managing with its own money
for the first time in 40 years. 235  In addition to being able to
support itself, Quebec would save the $30 billion a year that it
sends to Ottawa.236
Quebec already is preparing for the next Quebecois conven-
237tion. In February, 1999, groups began seeking advice on a
range of secession issues such as Quebec's international role, a
partnership between a sovereign Quebec and Canada, citizenship
and democracy, and defending Quebec's interests in the House of
Commons. 238 The groups' findings will be the focus of discussions
at the 2000 convention.239
As seen throughout this discussion, the reactions to the
Canadian Supreme Court decision have been mixed. At the outset,
both sides were claiming victory, although most were puzzled by
Quebec's jubilation. Now will Quebec pursue secession or simply
threaten it?
V. Analysis
Now that secession is possible by meeting the two conditions
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the rest of Canada? Why should Quebec go to the trouble of
presenting the Court with the secession issue if it simply can use
secession as a threat to seek leverage? The most prudent plan for
Quebec is to continue threatening secession until the threat is seen
as just that. Then when the economy is strong enough and
Quebecers see that they are not getting the special privileges they
have been seeking for over two hundred years, they should secede.
Quebec has wanted its own unique provincial recognition since
the Constitutional Act of 1867.240 Canada has rejected Quebec's
desire for special recognition for the last century. This time, the
Supreme Court told Quebec that it could not secede unilaterally.
Although separatists claimed victory after this decision, maybe they
are getting tired of getting rejected. It may be in Canada's best
interest to take Quebec's threats seriously, because Quebec may be
close to its breaking point.
Quebec cannot be blamed for wanting to celebrate its own
culture without Canada controlling its every move. Since Canada
was formed, Quebec has sought independence, but has not been
strong enough to attempt it. If ever a good time existed or
independence, it may be now because separatist leader Bouchard
will make every effort to build Quebec's strength for secession.
Therefore, Quebec should take advantage of this position and
attempt secession.
According to the polls, the majority of Quebecers do not want
to take this chance.241 Nevertheless, they re-elected Bouchard
knowing his strong stance on secession. Perhaps they would like
their independence, but fear what might happen if they fail.
Bouchard may be correct. Perhaps once the economy becomes
stronger, Quebecers will be ready to admit they want to secede.242
It may come sooner than later with Bouchard in office pushing for
it. Until Quebecers are prepared to draw up another referendum,
however, Bouchard should not hesitate to use secession as leverage
to opt out of the programs that Quebec does not like.
Bouchard said that Quebec would accept a constitutional
amendment that would allow it to opt out of social programs and
receive full compensation.243 Of course, Quebec would like to
have this opportunity, but will Canada give Quebec the chance?
Quebec's only hope is that Canada will fear its secession and bend
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to Quebec's demands. At this point, secession may only be a
threat, but Canada cannot be sure when it will become serious.
Several journalists feel that it may not be a joke. Canada may
want to think twice before denying Quebec the right to opt out of
some programs. If Canada does not, it may lose Quebec and its
economic support.
Quebec would not have gone to the trouble of presenting the
issue of unilateral secession to the Supreme Court if it was not
serious. It would have been a considerable waste of resources if
Quebec were not interested in the outcome. If the Supreme Court
had held that Quebec could, in fact, unilaterally secede, Quebec
would probably have left Canada already. Now Quebec has some
obstacles to overcome if it wants to secede.
First, Quebec must obtain a clear majority vote within Quebec
to secede.2" Bouchard believes that fifty-one percent will be
sufficient, but he does not have that support yet.245 The support
may come in just a matter of months. If Quebec is unhappy and
is strong enough to survive on its own, obtaining a clear majority
will be easy. The second step may be more difficult.
The second obstacle is negotiating with Canada.246 It will be
challenging getting the rest of Canada to let Quebec go. On the
other hand, Canada may be too tired and frustrated to intercede.
With the majority of Quebec desiring independence, it may be hard
for Canada to say "No." It depends on how Canada is feeling at
the time of negotiations. Quebec is a large part of their country,
but surely Canada would be able to survive without it.
Canada is concerned that its access to the U.S. market and the
economic, advantages that comes with it will be threatened if
Quebec secedes. 247 The U.S. is Canada's biggest trading partner
and last year they traded $564 billion in goods and services. 24s
Without a united Canada, Minister Dion's fear is that it will lose its
bargaining clout internationally.2 49  In an attempt to frighten
Quebec, Dion points out that Quebec would not automatically have
access to NATO.25 ° While this may be Canada's concern, a
Canada minus Quebec would surely have more power in the
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international trading arena than an independent Quebec. Canada
may lose the $30 billion a year that it receives from Quebec, but it
would not have the disadvantage Quebec has by entering the
international world on its own. Quebec, however, is in the position
to be selfish because it can support itself economically. If Quebec
is going to go beyond threatening secession, now is the time to do
it. It is Quebec's choice to venture out into the international
world.
When it comes time for Quebec to draw up a referendum,
what will it include? Whatever it includes, Quebec should take
care to present a clear issue of secession so as not to confuse
Canada. It will be interesting to see how Quebec decides to word
it.
Bouchard may simply be using the threat of secession to opt
out of programs he does not want Quebec to participate in, or he
may be serious about tearing free from Canada. Either way,
Bouchard and Quebec should be claiming victory because the
Canadian Supreme Court set forth steps that could lead to
Quebec's independence. Now is Quebec's opportunity to attempt
secession and freedom.
VI. Conclusion
A recent Supreme Court decision tugged tourists away from
their adventures on August 21, 1998. The Court held that Quebec
could not secede unilaterally from Canada. Despite the Court's
denial, Quebec was shouting, "Victory!" Quebec may not be
permitted to secede unilaterally, but it may attempt secession after
fulfilling two requirements. First, Quebec must obtain a clear
majority vote from its citizens demanding secession. Second,
Quebec must participate in a detailed negotiation process with
Canada. After decades of fighting for independence, Quebec
finally has some hope.
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